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In this paper we examine whether absorptive capacity can constitute sufficient 
justification for rejecting the proposal of a large aid increase to support the ‘big push’. 
We argue that the probability of a poverty trap exists for many countries, in particular 
the least developed countries (LDCs) and that an increase in aid is relevant for them. 
Moreover we show that the decrease in marginal aid returns is slower in vulnerable 
countries, which supports the rationale to include vulnerability as one of the 
aid-allocation criteria. We examine the main obstacles to absorptive capacity, such as 
disbursement constraints and short-term bottlenecks, macroeconomic problems, 
including loss in competitiveness and macroeconomic volatility, as well as the 
weakening of institutions. The general conclusion that we draw for reconciling the two 
approaches is that absorptive capacity strongly influenced by aid itself or by its 
modalities. The big push and absorptive capacity approaches cannot be reconciled 
without aid reform supported by an aid increase. First, what is needed is to balance the 
utilization of aid between activities that are directly productive and those that are social 
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in nature in order to avoid transitory loss of competitiveness. Second, schemes that 
facilitate the use of aid as insurance against exogenous shocks are to be enhanced 
because they lower the risk of Dutch disease, and contribute to faster and more 
equitable growth over the long term. Finally a performance-based conditionality should 
replace the traditional policy-based one in order to cope with several absorptive capacity 
limitations, particularly the sociopolitical one. An aid-supported big push will not be 




Two opposing views seem to dominate the present aid debate: the ‘big push’ thesis and 
the absorptive capacity concern. The big push is supported in particular by Jeffrey Sachs 
(2005) and is based on the poverty trap concept, while the absorptive capacity concern 
collects in a multifold concept several opposing views to the first approach. On one 
hand, there is the United Nations’ mot d’ordre ‘doubling aid to reduce poverty by half’, 
and on the other hand, the reviving scepticism that aid will not be absorbed usefully. 
The End of Poverty, by Jeffrey Sachs (2005) faces the White Man’s Burden by Bill 
Easterly (2006a). Incidentally, the term ‘big push’ does not appear in the index of 
Sachs’ book but then neither is ‘absorptive capacity’ found in the Easterly index. The 
concept ‘big push’ listed in the Easterly index refers to the ‘legend of the big push’, and 
‘absorptive capacity’ in the Sachs index makes reference to the statement: ‘Limited 
absorptive capacity is not an argument against aid. It is the very reason that aid is 
needed!’  
These two opposing views are not really new and paradoxically have common roots. 
One author, Rosenstein-Rodan, may even appear as a major contributor both to the big 
push theory and to the absorptive capacity concept applied to foreign aid. He first 
argued for the idea of increasing returns, for a big push, in 1943. During the 1950s he 
was joined by other development pioneers, in particular Nurkse (1953), who underlined 
the need for balanced growth to break the vicious circle of the supply and demand of 
capital. In 1961, Rosenstein-Rodan presented a comprehensive use of the absorptive 
capacity concept to measure the capital needs of the developing countries, based on the 
famous proposal by Millikan and Rostow (1957) to allocate aid according to capacity 
(once domestic saving were taken into account). Nurkse himself referred to the 
limitations of aid’s absorptive capacity for investment, as did most of the main works on 
development economics in the 1950s. These limitations were first acknowledged in 
BRD’s Fourth Annual Report in 1949 (see Guillaumont 1971 for a historic survey). 
Why did not absorptive capacity and the big push appear as contradictory half a century 
ago as they do today? First, both concepts are founded on the idea that low-income 
countries face structural obstacles to growth, which are reflected in the absorptive 
capacity and which require massive investment in interdependent sectors to be resolved. 
Second, aid today is likely to increase significantly: absorptive capacity then becomes a 
kind of warning against the risk of waste, whereas in the past it was a criterion for 
mobilizing more aid. Fifty years ago the main criticism of aid was not presented in this 
context. Coming from rather extreme and opposite political positions, whether liberal or 
radical, criticism was targeted at the support given through aid either to enlarging states 
or to non-democratic regimes and corrupted bourgeoisies. 
Currently, opposition is somewhat different. The main argument for doubling aid is not 
simply to fill a financial gap, but to push countries out of the stagnation trap which will 
be impossible to escape otherwise (without, however, any clear statistical link between 
the size of the needed push and requirements for aid). The criticism then is an attack 
against the idea of a trap and its big push corollary. Other critical opinions or 
reservations—mostly with regard to the notion of absorptive capacity—are intended to 
highlight all the reasons why increased aid is likely to be useless, wasted or even 
harmful. Consequently an increase in aid would not lead to a big push nor the 
subsequent escape from poverty. 2 
In this context the notion of absorptive capacity of external aid has been used in 
connection with several different, at times contradictory, meanings. We can identify 
four main meanings: 
—  The first is the ‘pipeline’ effect; disbursement constraints or disbursement 
slowness, evidenced by a low rate of utilization of credits or a long lag 
between commitments and disbursements. 
—  The second meaning refers to possible macroeconomic problems associated 
with large aid inflows (disbursements): these include in particular the loss of 
competitiveness through real currency appreciation (‘Dutch disease’ effect) 
and the recently debated effects of aid volatility.  
—  The third and more classical meaning of absorptive capacity is a decrease (or 
possibly a cancellation) in the marginal return of aid beyond a certain point in 
the terms of growth when analysed at the macro level, in terms of projects or 
specific expenditures when analysed at the microlevel. This is the ‘decreasing 
returns’ effect. 
—  Finally, a fourth meaning should be added, which is the ‘sociopolitical 
approach’, or the weakening of institutions induced by aid or a lack of social 
assimilation. 
In this paper we examine whether absorptive capacity, according to each of these four 
meanings, represents a justifiable reason for rejecting the proposal of a large increase in 
aid to help poor countries to leave the underdevelopment trap, subject to the existence 
of such a trap. To do so we consider the following points and related questions: 
—  The poverty trap hypothesis: fact or fiction? We argue this is a probability for 
many countries, particularly LDCs. Consequently, increased aid for these 
states is important; 
—  Disbursement constraints and short-term bottlenecks: why is there an 
underutilization of credits? Reforming the aid procedures is needed to 
overcome these constraints; 
—  Macroeconomic difficulties, including the loss of competitiveness and 
macroeconomic volatility: to what extent is there the risk of Dutch disease? 
What is needed here is a focus on both productivity and on the stabilizing 
impact of aid; 
—  Decreasing returns: why are they decreasing more or less quickly? We argue 
that the decrease is slowed down in vulnerable countries, which makes these 
nations a priority in aid allocation; 
—  Institution weakening: how can it be avoided? We believe that it can be 
avoided to a large extent with performance-based conditionality. 
2  Underdevelopment trap: not the rule, but a risk for many, 
particularly the LDCs 
The possibility that low-income countries may be locked in a trap of poverty or 
underdevelopment and that their chance of moving out of the trap is dependent on large 
inflows of aid can be considered as the underlying principle of the UN Millennium 3 
Project and of the Report of the Blair Commission on Africa. It is also the basis of the 
related proposals to find new and additional development resources, such as the 
International Financial Facility. However, the underlying principle has recently been 
challenged in several studies, some rather sophisticated and academic, others rather 
polemical. The issue is actually extensive and quite complicated. Without going into 
details of the debate, we take a look at the main arguments of the recent critique. These 
appear twofold: (i) there are neither analytical nor empirical grounds for the existence of 
a trap, (ii) nor is there evidence of aid being a factor likely to support the big push (out 
of the trap). In spite of the critique, our conclusions support the importance of an aid-
supported big push.  
2.1  Truncated criticism of the concept of a low-level equilibrium 
The concept of a poverty trap at the macro level, developed in the 1950s in particular by 
Leibenstein (1954) and Nelson (1956), has recently been revitalized. Sachs et al. (2004) 
re-examine three sources of a trap, i.e., a low level stable equilibrium, namely 
increasing returns, the saving income function and the fertility income function. The 
two first factors have been debated in particular by Kraay and Raddatz (2005), who 
argue that the functions do not conform to such conditions that could lead to a trap. 
Their scepticism seems to be endorsed by the Global Monitoring Report 2005, ‘In 
general  …  neither macroeconomic nor microeconomic evidence tends to support the 
existence of such traps’. Easterly’s criticism in his book (2006a) and in a recent review 
paper (2006b) has been more radical. 
A purely empirical argument has been added to the analytical scepticism and can be 
summarized as follows: the number of countries that forty or fifty years ago were low 
income but that have been able to grow significantly and to move up from this low level 
is not negligible. Thus a low level of income by itself is not a stable equilibrium or a 
trap, a fact which cannot be contested.  
The point is that many countries, which were initially considered as low-income, have 
remained poor and they share certain common structural characteristics, suggesting that 
the combination of these characteristics creates conditions conducive to low level 
equilibrium. In Guillaumont (2006), we identify these in the persistently low-income 
per capita countries as the combination of a relatively low level of human capital and a 
high vulnerability to exogenous shocks. These two structural handicaps interact which 
makes sustained growth rather unlikely for logical reasons not rejected by econometric 
tests. Furthermore, these factors—in addition to the low level of income per capita—are 
precisely the same elements that the UN uses to identify the LDCs. It would then appear 
that a group of nations, corresponding roughly to the present LDCs, can be considered to 
constitute the future’s most likely low-income countries. Briefly stated, not all low-
income countries are ‘trapped’, but some clearly are and these are the LDCs. 
More precisely we find that: 
—  While there is no absolute convergence among all developing countries; two 
clear regimes of absolute convergence exist, the non-LDCs, and the LDCs, at a 
significantly lower level, and leading to a lower steady state; 
—  Over a long (30-year) period, differences in income per capita perspectives 
among developing countries are rather well explained by three factors that 4 
correspond to the LDC identification criteria: in addition to the initial level of 
income per capita, the two variables reflecting structural handicaps—an 
economic vulnerability index and an index of human capital weakness, both 
expressed in logs—are significant negative factors. This means that they reflect 
an obstacle to growth or the possibility of a trap, all the more so because of 
their interaction (quite weaker results are found with the linear specification). 
Of course there can be other interpretations of the logic behind the notion of an 
underdevelopment trap (see, for instance, Berthélemy 2006), but it seems necessary to 
look at the structural specificities or initial conditions of countries that have been poor 
and remained poor for long period. 
2.2  Misuse of aid effectiveness literature to deny the possibility of a big push  
Another argument that has been used to downplay the possibilities of a big push 
supported by high aid inflows for moving countries out of the trap is in the mitigated 
results of cross-country regressions on aid effectiveness.  
First, the results are not as ambiguous as is often argued, although the aggregate concept 
of aid has such a heterogeneous content that it makes it difficult to obtain very strong 
results. As we see later, positive results on aid effectiveness (possibly contingent on 
specific factors) have been found to be robust in external assessments (see Roodman 
2004, for instance, on Hansen and Tarp 2001 and on Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001) 
and on Burnside and Dollar (2004). In particular, we argue that aid is efficient in 
promoting growth in countries that are vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Guillaumont 
and Chauvet 2001, Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004, 2006). We note that in a recent 
sceptical survey of aid-growth regressions referred to by opponents to the big push-
cum-aid, the authors (Rajan and Subramanian 2005b) omit consideration of the 
vulnerability factor of aid effectiveness. 
Second, it is a debatable issue to consider that none of the low-income countries that 
have been able to emerge, were supported by large, or even transitory, inflows of 
external aid. The most successful aid process is precisely the type that leads to self-
sustained growth, and ultimately to a weaker aid-growth relationship. It seems that 
present econometric studies have not adequately addressed the time sequence of this 
relationship. Historical perspective is needed, which we can obtain by reviewing Korea, 
Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, Tunisia—the countries that over the past decades have 
emerged or are now emerging. At the beginning of their growth period, these countries 
received significant inflows of aid which have subsequently and quite normally 
decreased during periods of growth.1 For instance the average aid-to-GDP ratio has 
decreased in Korea from 6.3 per cent in the 1960s to 0.1 in the 1980s, and in Tunisia 
from 8.1 per cent in the 1960s to 1.5 per cent during 1990-2003. Let us look at the few 
LDCs which were upgraded by the UN from the LDC status after they had experienced 
certain degree of growth: Botswana in 1994, Cape Verde and Maldives in 2004 (albeit 
with postponed implementation of the decision). They had all received an initially high 
level of aid which then declined, suggesting that countries locked into a trap can escape 
                                                 
1  In India, due to size, the aid-to-GDP ratio has always been low. However, after adjustment for the size 
factor, it also appears to have been significant, then declining 5 
with the help of international community. For instance in Botswana the aid-to-GDP 
ratio has decreased from 18.8 per cent in the 1980s to 1.9 per cent in 1990-2003.2 But it 
should be remembered that not all of these countries were LDCs with the severest initial 
conditions, particularly with regard to human capital, a fact which made it easier to 
move up. But these conditions—particularly human capital—could have been supported 
by prior aid. If the aim of aid inflows is to lead to sustained growth, it is worthwhile to 
facilitate the progress by changing the preconditional requirements of a possible 
takeoff.3 
3  Disbursement constraints: a need to reform procedures 
Disbursement constraints constitute to the first difficulty of absorbing more aid. The 
problem of the lag between commitments and disbursements has been considered for 
many years (Guillaumont 1967) but curiously has not led to many studies, even though 
quantitative analysis can be easily applied. Complaints by recipients (and at times by 
donors) about the large gap between cumulative commitments and disbursements, the 
so-called ‘pipeline’, are becoming more and more frequent. The rate of underutilization 
of credits, in fact, is in some cases very high, leading to scepticism about the possibility 
of recipients being able to use significantly higher amounts of aid. 
The reasons behind this underutilization may lie in the circumstances of the receiving 
countries, such as low administrative capacities or weak transportation infrastructure, as 
well as the non-fulfilment of conditions attached to disbursement. However, with these 
facts in mind, Svensson (2006) observes: 
a strong bias towards ‘always’ disbursing committed funds to the ex ante 
designated recipient, or project, irrespective of the recipient government’s 
performance, or the conditions of other potential aid recipient countries 
(projects) …  
Here the risk constitutes excess spending under budget pressure rather than 
disbursement lag. 
But disbursement lags may also result from the inadequacy of aid modalities to adjust to 
recipient circumstances. ‘Aid fragmentation’ or the multiplicity of aid sources in a 
country, each with different procedures, forms and disbursement conditions, becomes a 
greater problem when the country is small with low administrative capacities. Donors 
are inclined to target support for the reinforcement of the recipient’s administrative 
capacities rather than modify their own behaviour. This is a valuable but a long-term 
process, as is the improvement of transport facilities and infrastructure which also 
makes the disbursement of project aid easier. Identifying and attacking such bottlenecks 
will stay on the agenda for a long time. 
                                                 
2  In Cape Verde it has decrease from 37 per cent in the 1980s to 16 per cent in 2000-03 and in the 
Maldives from 14 per cent to 3.7 per cent.  
3  More generally the issue of evaluation is counterfactual, as usual. It is always difficult to say what 
would have happened without aid in very poor countries. 6 
The solution is to search for more appropriate procedures. In addition to considerations 
of ‘alignment’ and ‘predictability’ (we revert to these later), the Declaration of the Paris 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 underlines the need for the ‘harmonization’ of 
procedures, and defines related indicators. However, to quote Heller (2005): 
Current approaches with respect to the goals for harmonization … are still far 
short of the professed objectives and aid recipients have reasons to be uncertain 
about how long it will take for these gaps to be closed. Moreover, it must be 
daunting for LDCs to catalogue both the number of donors with which they 
must work, as well as the multiplicity of their objectives, modalities of 
operation, underlying criteria for aid levels, and conditionalities and terms of 
aid. 
Given the difficulties of the harmonization process, which is progressing very slowly, 
one cannot help but wonder whether a more radical reform might not be needed. It 
could—as we see later—consist of adopting an outcome-based conditionality, thus 
meeting both the concerns of disbursement lags and disbursement incentives, and 
eliminating bias from either source. 
3  Macroeconomic drawbacks from higher aid inflows: are they real? 
We now assume that not only commitments but also disbursements are significantly 
increased, albeit with some possible delay. Disbursement lags postpone the risk of 
macroeconomic drawbacks which we examine next. Two kinds of problems have been 
extensively considered in recent literature. One is the risk resulting from an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate; the second risk, likely to reinforce the first, is associated with 
the volatility of aid flows. These two risks, while not negligible, are often 
overestimated, and deserve, at the very least, adequate assessment with regard to some 
basic economic principles. 
3.1  Real exchange rate concern: will aid increase induce a loss of competitiveness?  
There are a number of studies that point to the risk of a real exchange rate appreciation 
after the scaling-up of aid flows, by authors either from the IMF and World Bank,4 or 
from the academic aid literature.5 It is argued that increased aid inflows generate the 
Dutch disease effect through a real exchange rate appreciation, with a subsequent loss of 
competitiveness in the tradable sectors, harming exports as well as competitive import 
substitution. Aid can induce this effect; either through increased domestic prices of non-
tradables in a fixed exchange rate regime, or through the appreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate in a regime of floating rates.  
The empirical evidence on the occurrence of the Dutch disease seems to be weakening 
(see, for instance, some studies in Berg et al. 2005). Gupta, Powell and Yang (2005) 
                                                 
4   See Arellano et al. (2005); Heller (2005); Gupta, Powell and Yang (2006); Rajan and Subramanian 
(2005a, 2005b); World Bank and IMF (2005, 2006). 
5  See Adam and Bevan (2006); Adam 2005, Bevan (2005); Gunning (2004). 7 
present a sample of econometric studies which illustrate the contradiction among the 
results. Some authors find a positive link between aid inflows and real exchange rate 
(e.g., Kasekende and Atingi-Ego 1999 for Ghana), while others observe a negative link. 
Even the influential paper by Rajan and Subramanian (2005a) which argues that aid has 
a negative effect on the share of labour-intensive and tradable industries, only suggests 
that this may be due to a real appreciation. The hypothesis is not tested, nor is 
consideration given to possible effects on other tradables, such as agriculture and 
tradable services, which may be particularly important in small and highly aid-
dependent developing countries. 
Why is there so little evidence? In the short run, the increase in the price of non-
tradables occurs only if productive capacity in the non-tradable sector is fully utilized. If 
there is underutilized capacity, for instance, due to disguised urban unemployment, the 
supply elasticity may be relatively high. In the long run, real appreciation will occur 
after a sustained higher aid level only if it is not compensated by an increase of 
productivity in the non-tradable sector, as Heller (2005) argues in recommending the 
use of aid to favour such an increase, which in reality is not easy. 
Moreover in the longer run, an increase in productivity in the tradable sector is likely to 
compensate the effect on competitiveness of a possible rise of the non-tradable price. 
According to the Balassa-Samuelson theorem, if income growth per capita that is higher 
than in the rest of the world involves appreciation of the real exchange rate, then the big 
push should lead to a similar affect. Thus there cannot be a big push without real 
appreciation—if aid succeeds in supporting the big push, it would cause the real value 
of the currency to appreciate. Appreciation is no longer a problem, it is a reflection of 
the strategy’s success. 
These arguments have strong implications for economic policy. In the short run, 
macroeconomic management of increased aid inflows may help to prevent an over-rapid 
rise of non-tradable relative prices, although sterilization of reserves can be only a 
transitory and partial solution (Heller 2005). More important is to consider the uses of 
aid as well as of public domestic resources. It is necessary to maintain a balance 
between aid allocated to productive sectors and aid to social sectors. Aid to increase the 
health and education of children will indeed increase productivity, but only in the long 
term. Using aid to improve infrastructure is an important factor for increasing 
absorptive capacity (Agénor et al. 2006). Briefly stated, aid that strives to promote 
balanced growth also needed to be balanced. 
3.3  Threaten of aid volatility: is aid destabilizing or stabilizing? 
Aid volatility has become a very fashionable topic and is one of the favourite arguments 
to illustrate the dangers of a rapid increase in aid. Aid, if volatile, might be a source of 
macroeconomic instability and all the more so the higher the level of aid.6 This can be a 
way of highlighting absorptive capacity. Aid indeed may appear volatile, but it does not 
mean it is destabilizing, nor is it likely to be so, if its level is increased. Next we 
                                                 
6   Bulỉř and Hamann (2003, 2005); Lensink and Morrissey (2000); Pallage and Robe (2001); Rand and 
Tarp (2002); Eifert and Gelb (2005). 8 
summarize the conclusions of an on-going research partly presented in Guillaumont 
(2006b) and Chauvet and Guillaumont (2006). 
The first issue is to choose a second monetary flow which is relevant for the comparison 
of aid volatility, usually tax revenue, in order to examine the effect of aid instability on 
public budget stability or national income. Because the concern is with macroeconomic 
vulnerability, it is preferable to compare aid fluctuations (or cycle) with the exports of 
goods and services, the aggregate of which is the most likely to be affected by 
exogenous shocks. Tax revenues, as well as national income, are influenced by the 
overall impact of exports, but also by aid. Moreover, all aid flows are not channelled 
through the public budget, a fact that makes it important to consider the volatility of the 
different types of aid (Fielding and Mavrotas 2005). 
In comparing total aid (net) to (goods and services) export fluctuations (measured in 
various ways), Guillaumont (2006b) and Chauvet and Guillaumont (2006) come to the 
three following conclusions: 
i)  Over thirty years (1970-99), the average level of aid volatility for a large 
sample of developing countries has been approximately the same as that of 
exports but half the export volatility level for the African subsample. Measured 
on 8-year subperiods with a cycle component with regard to a trend drawn 
from a Hodrick-Prescott filter, both aid and export volatilities on average are 
equivalent to 8.8 per cent for the whole sample, while they are 5.9 per cent 
(aid) and 11.2 (exports) for the African subsample. 
ii)  Criticism of aid volatility may be misplaced if aid has a compensatory profile, 
which could be consistent with the finding that aid is more effective in more 
vulnerable countries (see above). As previously argued for real exchange rate 
appreciation, aid volatility could be a solution rather than a problem. In that 
perspective, the volatility of aid is not to be criticized per se so much as its 
procyclicality. With regard to exports, procyclicality appears not to be the rule, 
not even in the majority of cases, as is sometimes asserted. The procyclical 
character of aid is measured by the correlation between the ‘cycle’ of aid (that 
is, its deviation from its trend) and the ‘cycle’ of exports. Using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter and considering more than 100 developing countries over the 
period 1970-99 (broken down into 8-year subperiods which produced 465 
subperiod observations), country correlation between the cycle of net aid 
disbursements and the cycle of exports of goods and services appears to be 
negative almost as often as positive (222 cases versus 243). A similar balance 
is found for the African subsample. This means that aid is nearly as often 
countercyclical as procyclical. Furthermore in the majority of cases the 
correlation coefficients on which the comparison is based are not significant.7 
iii)  Measuring counter- or procyclicality is less relevant than determining whether 
aid inflow is stabilizing or destabilizing with regard to total aid plus export 
flows. Procyclical aid can still be stabilizing if its volatility, expressed in 
relative terms, is lower than the volatility of exports. There may also be 
opposite and paradoxical cases where aid is countercyclical and destabilizing, 
                                                 
7  At a 15 per cent threshold. 9 
when its volatility is significantly higher than that of exports, depending on the 
relative levels of aid and exports.8 What is the real picture? To assess   
the stabilizing character of aid, we consider an index corresponding to the 
difference between the instability (volatility) of exports and that of the aid plus 
export flows. If the difference is positive, aid is stabilizing; if negative, aid is 
destabilizing. Generally, aid had stabilizing impact, particularly during the 
1990s than during previous periods, indicating on average 18 per cent of the 
average value of the instability of exports (28 per cent for the African 
subsample). In the majority of cases where aid was procyclical, it was then 
stabilizing. When aid was countercyclical, it was, as expected, generally but 
not always stabilizing. On the whole, aid had destabilizing affect in less than 
one-tenth of the cases. Figure 1 demonstrates that the stabilizing impact of aid 
(measured by the difference between the two instabilities) is all the more 
important the higher the aid-to-GDP ratio is, and is not significantly influenced 
by the level of aid volatility. 
iv)  In the future, if aid amounts grow substantially, the potential stabilizing or 
destabilizing impact with regard to exports will be higher, but the risk of a 
destabilizing impact will remain low since in the case of procyclicality, it is 
conditioned by a level of volatility higher than that of exports. 
Given that export are not the only exogenous source of instability, it is also relevant to 
examine whether aid contributes to reducing or enhancing growth volatility, once the 
influence of the traditional structural factors of this overall volatility is taken into 
account. Using GMM estimator with 5-year average observations, and applying initial 
income per capita, exports-to-GDP ratio and export volatility as control variables, it 
appears that the aid-to-GDP ratio has a significant negative impact on growth volatility 
(aid-to-GDP ratio and income per capita instrumented)9 (Chauvet and Guillaumont 
2006). 
Even if aid has on average had rather stabilizing outcome in the past, some policy 
lessons can be drawn to avoid the destabilizing effect of higher aid levels in the future. 
On the donor side, the principle of conditionality is itself a potential instability factor, 
and all the more so once donor policies are harmonized (Heller 2005). However the 
move towards a more gradual conditionality, generated through an output-based 
conditionality, may lower the risk of aid instability since the assessment of results or 
outcome is less dichotomic than that of policy measures implementation. Moreover, 
better transparency in the criteria of aid allocation may render aid more predictable and 
then facilitate the domestic management of aid flows. 
Finally it is argued that aid can be used more extensively as insurance to smooth public 
and private incomes in the face of export instability or other shocks. As we have 
                                                 
8  The arithmetic condition is that the absolute value of the ratio of the relative cycles exceeds one by 
twice the ratio of exports to aid.  
9   Aid volatility added alone to the regression does not change the result and is not significant. When a 
multiplicative variable (aid ratio x aid volatility) is added, it appears significantly positive, suggesting 
a threshold beyond which an increase of the aid to GDP ratio may become a factor of macroeconomic 
instability. But this last result is not very robust, as it can be expected, since the impact of aid 
volatility differs from one country to the next, depending on proper countercyclicality.  10 
explained elsewhere, solutions do exist that can be built on a contractual basis involving 
the international community, recipient-country governments and producer groups 
respecting market trends (Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2003; Guillaumont 
et al. 2005). Notably, they include grant disbursement and/or debt service adjustment in 
response to price shocks, and support to domestic insurance schemes targeted to 
agricultural producers.  
On the recipient side, higher aid dependency needs a cautious management of the 
domestic fiscal space. The government has to be able to maintain some flexibility in 
public expenditures and to save some potential for domestic borrowing. It may also find 
it appropriate to accumulate a certain level of foreign reserves that are likely to be used 
to smooth the impact of aid inflows.  
Figure 1 
Stabilizing impact of aid with regard to exports,  





















4  Decreasing returns: occurring more slowly in vulnerable countries 
Absorptive capacity, in the usual meaning of the concept, is associated with decreasing 
returns. There may be decreasing returns of aid, as with any other factor. However, 
decreasing returns do not exclude increasing returns below a specific aid level, 
consistent with the big push hypothesis. An additional analytical difficulty comes from 
the fact that the turning point is likely to differ among recipient countries, depending on 
the specific characteristics and circumstances of each nation. Here we focus on their 
structural vulnerability since in our previous works this has appeared to constitute a 
significant factor of aid effectiveness. We rely on both macro and micro evidence to 
argue that vulnerability influences the profile of aid’s marginal returns. 11 
4.2  Lessons from growth regressions: is the big push justified by vulnerability? 
The test of the decreasing marginal returns of aid has been an important part of the 
debate on aid-growth relationships. In growth regressions both the aid variable and its 
squared value are included as explanatory variables, with respectively positive and 
negative coefficients expected. This specification involved not only a decreasing 
marginal impact of aid on growth, but also that an aid increase beyond a certain level is 
detrimental to growth (inverse U curb). The turning point could be construed as a 
measurement of absorptive capacity. Conversely, if the coefficients are respectively 
negative and positive, or only significant and positive for the squared term, it is an 
argument in favour of the big push. 
The estimation, including the aid term and its squared value, was run initially by 
Hadjimichael et al. (1995) with reference to absorptive capacity constraints, and has 
since then become common practice (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 
2001, 2002; Hansen and Tarp 2000, 2001; Lensink and White 2001). Results vary 
considerably, with the squared term being either significantly negative or insignificant. 
The results depend, as clearly documented by Hansen and Tarp, in particular on whether 
another nonlinearity is introduced in the model through a multiplicative term of aid.  
In earlier studies on the influence of vulnerability on aid effectiveness (Guillaumont and 
Chauvet 2001; Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004), non-linearity was introduced through a 
multiplicative term (aid x vulnerability index), but without the aid squared term. Results 
suggest that aid is more effective in more vulnerable countries or in other words, the 
negative impact of vulnerability is dampened by aid. A more recent paper focusing on 
Africa (Chauvet and Guillaumont 2006) comes to a similar conclusion, with the 
instability of goods and services export as only measure of vulnerability. This allows us 
to assess the stabilizing impact of aid examined above. Regressions are run on a sample 
of 38 African countries for six 5-year periods (with GMM and additional 
instrumentation of aid). Controlling for aid ratio and export instability levels, we obtain 
a significant positive impact on growth of either the multiplicative variable (aid x export 
instability) or of the indicator of the stabilization impact of aid (the difference between 
the instability of exports and the instability of the aggregate flow [export plus aid]). In 
these specifications, the marginal effectiveness of aid does depend on vulnerability, but 
not on the aid level. It suggests that if there were a turning point based on the aid level 
(evidenced by a significant coefficient of squared value of aid), this point would be 
eliminated by higher vulnerability.  
To simultaneously test the existence of two successive turning points which correspond, 
first, to a minimum amount of aid below which it is no longer effective (an approach to 
the big push), and second to the level beyond which it becomes ineffective (a measure 
of the absorptive capacity), it might be conceivable to estimate the growth regression 
with not only the aid variable and its squared value, but also its cubic value, expecting 
the coefficients to be successively negative, and positive and negative, and the returns 
being at the two turning points successively increasing and decreasing. Then the two 
approaches could be reconciled. However this specification is not very appropriate: 
there is no reason to expect negative marginal returns instead of nil returns below the 
first threshold, or even beyond the second one. This is why it seems better to look for 
thresholds which empirically differentiate aid growth relationships according to the 
level of aid. This has been done by Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2003). They find 
that aid beyond 2 per cent of GNP becomes effective in contributing to growth and there 12 
is no evidence of diminishing returns to aid afterwards. But, by using annual growth 
data, these authors may be capturing short-term rather than long-term aid effects. 
Moreover, the threshold is assumed to be the same for all countries, but it is likely that 
aid effectiveness thresholds depend on the specific circumstances of recipient countries.  
4.3  New micro evidence from project evaluation 
confirming the impact of vulnerability 
The ambiguous results of growth regressions regarding aid effectiveness thresholds may 
be due to some extent to the heterogeneity of aid aggregates, including projects, budget 
support, debt relief, technical assistance, etc. For this reason it is useful to consider a 
more homogeneous set of aid inflows, for instance, a set of projects, and to analyse 
whether their results depend on the total amount of aid as well as the specific features of 
recipient countries. If our assumption holds that aid’s marginal returns are influenced by 
the vulnerability of countries, this should be reflected at the micro level, as we see now. 
The working paper by Guillaumont and Laajaj (2006) considers the results of an 
evaluation of World Bank projects conducted by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation 
Group. In this database the outcome of projects is measured on a six-scale notation 
ranging from very unsatisfactory to very satisfactory. This makes it easy to examine if 
the rate of success is influenced by the level of aid in the recipient countries and if this 
relationship depends on their economic vulnerability. We surmise that the rate of 
success decreases when the total amount of aid received by the country increases, but to 
a lesser extent in the highly vulnerable countries. 
Figure 2 


















This view is confirmed by Figure 2, which represents the average project success 
according to the combined levels of export instability and aid-to-GDP ratio. The success 
rate10 has been broken down into nine groups. ‘Low aid’ corresponds to a third of the 
projects carried out in countries receiving aid at less than 1 per cent of GDP (the lowest 
level of ODA); ‘high aid’ to the top third (receiving aid exceeding 8 per cent of GDP). 
Thus ‘medium aid’ went to the intermediate group; each group was similarly subdivided 
into the upper, middle and lower third groups of projects, according to the export 
instability of the countries, weighted by the exports-to-GDP ratio. 
As is seen, the average success rate for low aid-level countries is 15 points higher in a 
stable country. However, in stable countries, this rate decreases sharply when the level 
of aid increases, suggesting a limited absorptive capacity. On the other hand, in the most 
unstable countries, the success rate does not clearly decrease as  it is the highest in the 
most-generously aided countries; moreover in the most aided countries, the average 
success of projects is the greater the more unstable the country. 
Some econometric estimations confirm these relationships. Following Kaufmann and 
Wang (1995), Isham, Kaufman and Pritchett (1997), Isham and Kaufman (1999) and 
Levin and Dollar (2005) we estimate the factors determining the success of World Bank 
projects, but we do not aggregate project data at the national level so that the regressions 
are run at the micro level with an observation for each project. Since the outcome of the 
projects is measured on a six-scale notation, our econometric model is an ordered logit. 
It combines factors related to the characteristics of the project (sector, IDA or IBRD 
conditions, etc.) and to the circumstances of the country (income per capita, level of 
education, quality of institutions, etc.) (as well as year dummies). Our specific concern 
is to test the influence of the other, following variables: 
—  the total aid-to-GDP ratio, to identify possible decreasing (or increasing) aid 
returns (variable introduced also by Levin and Dollar); 
—  the volatility of exports, which can induce an unstable environment likely to be 
harmful for the fulfilment of projects; 
—  one variable multiplicative of the two previous ones, consistently with our 
previous finding at the macro level (with Chauvet) that aid dampens the 
negative effects of external shocks. 
We expect the success of projects to decline as the total amount of aid increases and as 
the recipient country faces external shocks (export instability), while the impact of the 
interactive (multiplicative) variable (aid x instability) becomes positive.11 The results of 
                                                 
10  A project is considered successful if it has been rated at least moderately satisfactory. 
11  In this model the success of project, which is directly estimated, is found to be decreasing when the 
coefficient of the aid value received by the implementing country is negative. Then if the outcome of 
projects is declining when the total amount of aid increases and if it is lower when the recipient 
country faces external shocks (export instability), the positive expected impact of the interactive 
(multiplicative) variable (aid x instability) means, as in the growth model, that aid dampens the effect 
of instability. By comparison in the aid-growth model the marginal return of aid is given by the first 
derivative of growth and is found positive and decreasing with the coefficients of aid and of its 
squared value are respectively positive and negative: in the aid-growth model aid lowers the negative 
impact of instability even if there are constant returns, in the success-of-project model the decrease of 
aid project outcome is slowed down by instability. When instability is high, aid outcome may cease to 
decrease or even be increasing. 14 
the base regression do not reject our hypotheses. The success of projects decreases less 
in the more unstable countries, a finding that emphasizes the need of aid in vulnerable 
countries. 
Another finding concerns the role of education in the success of projects. The rate of 
success is positively influenced by the level of education, but a low educational level 
dampens the negative impact of aid size on the success of projects. When a 
multiplicative variable of aid and education is introduced in the model, it appears to 
have a significant negative impact. This should not be surprising: aid has a knowledge 
content that makes its marginal impact higher the lower the level of education (similar 
finding in Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey 2003). 
Considering that both vulnerability and low human capital are factors of slower decline 
of aid effectiveness and that these two characteristics in conjunction with a low level of 
income are the criteria identifying the LDCs, this suggests that the function of success 
of projects may differ between LDCs and other developing countries. While 
vulnerability and lack of human capital have a negative impact on the average project 
success, they can moderate the possibility of failure, or even increase the chance of 
success when aid levels increase, which do not preclude such a decline beyond a certain 
level of aid. This means that they extend the limits of absorptive capacity. We then 
estimated a success-of-project model where the explanatory variables are the aid-to-
GDP ratio, its squared value, and a dummy variable for LDCs, introduced both 
additively and multiplicatively of the aid ratio and its squared value.12 The results are 
illustrated Figure 3. In the non-LDCs developing countries, the outcome of projects is  
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12  The variables corresponding to the identification of LDCs, income per capita, vulnerability, lack of 
human capital are excluded. 15 
generally higher than in LDCs, but declines when aid increases (the turning point of 
approximately 25 per cent aid ratio is not empirically relevant since countries reach this 
level of aid only in less than 1 per cent of the cases). In LDCs the average rate of 
success increases when the aid-to-GDP ratio increases, at least below the threshold 
estimated at around 17 per cent in the estimation corresponding to Figure 3, and does 
not decrease quickly beyond the threshold (25 per cent of cases beyond this point). 
Clearly, even if the LDCs have a lower average rate of success, they show increasing 
returns to aid and higher absorptive capacity. 
A final but not less intriguing result of the previous estimations is that institutions do 
not appear to be significant factor in the success of projects. 
5 Weakening  institutions:  towards  performance-based conditionality 
The relationship between aid and institutions of the recipient countries has been 
examined in the literature from three different angles. First in the aid effectiveness 
literature, institutions (and policy) have been presented as a crucial factor of 
effectiveness (in the ‘ABCD paradigm’ of assessing aid, e.g., Burnside, Collier, Dollar), 
a factor that is strongly debated, as is well known. Second, the impact of institutions on 
inter-country aid allocation has been analysed and debated, both as a positive issue and 
as a normative issue in particular with the aim to assess the selectivity of donors 
(Amprou, Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney 2007). Third, the effect of aid on 
the quality of policies and institutions has been for a long time a matter of concern and 
now is of topical interest, as it could significantly limit absorptive capacity. Relying on 
earlier studies on this last issue, we try to see how aid can be prevented from weakening 
the institutions of recipient countries.  
5.1  The institutional dimension of absorptive capacity 
Is aid dependency weakening domestic institutions which are now considered as an 
important factor of economic growth? Several potential negative effects of large aid 
inflows on institutions have been identified, mainly the detrimental impact of aid on 
private saving, on state revenue and the consequences on the accountability of public 
management ( or the link between the state and the civil society). 
The first analytical attack against foreign aid that has been largely debated on empirical 
grounds (Griffin 1970; Papanek 1973) was the crowding-out effect of aid on savings. A 
common conclusion at the aggregate level is that even if aid has a short-term negative 
impact on savings, it nevertheless increases investment and thus contributes through a 
higher income to a long-term increase of the saving ratio (Guillaumont 1985). The 
crowding-out effect was founded on two basic assumptions linked to policy and 
institutions. First, aid was assumed to dominate the better investment opportunities, 
discouraging private savings and investment. It would thus exert an institutional effect 
on the financial system, the deepening of which would be reduced. Whether this effect 
resulted from aid or from other sources of external finance is not known and has not 
been extensively investigated. 
The second crowding-out effect, related to fiscal revenue, has been examined in more 
detail, both through cross-section and country case studies. However results are 16 
mitigated, as is noted in the survey by Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle (2006). Even 
if the literature frequently finds a negative relationship, it raises several questions. The 
first is due to the heterogeneity of aid flows and tax receipts, with each tax group 
inducing specific responses to each aid type. Gupta et al. (2004) suggest that grants, but 
not loans, have a negative effect on total tax revenue, while Mavrotas (2005) (who also 
considers the effects on the different kinds of public expenditure) argues to the contrary, 
‘in Uganda the government did not reduce its tax effort following additional 
disbursements of different types of foreign aid’. A second problem is related to aid 
endogeneity. Aid and fiscal receipts are linked by reciprocal relations and may be 
influenced by common factors while the instrumentation of the aid variable is often 
unsatisfactory. Finally and most importantly, studies focused on the short-term impact 
of aid inflows do not capture the long-term institutional effects. 
With regard to long-run effects, two opposite views exist. On one hand, the concern 
over aid dependency leads to underlining the risk that the state is over-dependent on 
foreign aid and is thus accountable to foreign donors instead of the national population 
or civil society. From that perspective, the crowding-out of fiscal revenue is considered 
to be a factor of weak accountability, since governments do not need to maintain their 
legitimacy to collect revenue (Moss, Pettersson and van der Walle 2006). However, it is 
not certain that tax collection is always an aspect of democracy and institution-building, 
as the heavy taxation of African agriculture in the 1970s and thereafter has shown. On 
the other hand, increased aid can be considered as a transitory impulse that generates a 
pump-priming effect which will reduce the requirement for aid itself. A good example is 
given by tax policy: if aid enables a country to reduce high and distortionary taxation, it 
will help to remove the obstacle to growth and possibly lead to larger amounts of public 
revenue in the future (Gunning 2004). 
Other factors are the more detrimental effects of aid on institutions and these are mainly 
due to the way in which aid is delivered. There is indeed a sociopolitical dimension to 
absorptive capacity but it comes from aid modalities to some extent. This may seem 
paradoxical since larger and larger portions of aid are devoted to budget support, which 
is conditioned by policy reform. Traditional conditionality has been criticized strongly. 
In particular it has been argued that it was inefficient due to the common interest of the 
partners to act as if it was efficient (Collier et al. 1997). This criticism has found 
expression in the hypothesis by Burnside and Dollar (2000) that aid has no effect on 
policy. It has been challenged not only in cross-section studies (see, for instance, 
Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004),13 but also more significantly by the African case 
studies by the World Bank (Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren 2001) and by Berg (2003) 
and Tarp (2001). It is difficult not to acknowledge that the intense policy dialogue 
between donors and recipient governments has been sometimes successful in generating 
significant policy decisions or institution reforms. 
Furthermore, the crucial issue of ownership, already raised during the initial criticism of 
conditionality, seems to remain unsolved. The pressure of donors to ‘obtain’ policy 
measures and reforms, and the commitment of recipient countries to be accountable to 
external agents have resulted in governments and civil servants in these countries 
becoming distanced from full responsibility for their actions. Moreover they are less 
                                                 
13  Tests do not reject the hypothesis that policy is improved by aid when quality is weak, which leads to 
aid effectiveness being negatively influenced by previous policy (and positively by the current one). 17 
inclined to justify their action except by their external commitments. ‘The hypothesis 
here is that large aid flows fundamentally alter the relationship between government, 
elites and local citizens’ (Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006). This lack of 
ownership and accountability to citizens is enhanced by the weight of donor advice, 
presence, missions and own agenda, as stressed by Berg in his posthumous paper 
(2003). 
5.2  Why a performance-based conditionality is an answer to aid dependency 
Faced with the sociopolitical limits to absorptive capacity, the usual donor response is to 
consider that the main source of difficulties is the weak administrative capacity, which 
needs to be enhanced. Reinforcement of capacities has thus been a goal of aid, well-
reflected in the share of technical assistance provided. A future increase of aid should 
then justify further advances in this direction. It is a reasonable principle. However, it 
has at times been implemented in an inefficient manner. A common practice is to set up 
autonomous agencies in order to attract the best of the civil servants, with possibly 
higher wages after appropriate training, and to avoid administrative inertia. It is a short-
term search for efficiency, and often triggers discouragement within traditional 
administration. Policy that aims at reducing the number of civil servants but 
compensating the remainder with better pay possibly after appropriate training has a 
longer-term focus, although it may be politically difficult. 
The analysis of the drawbacks of aid dependency calls for deeper reform in aid practice. 
In previous papers, we have argued in favour of an outcome-based or performance-
based conditionality for budget support instead of conditionality that is based on the 
adoption of policy changes (Collier et al. 1997; Adam et al. 2004). Performance would 
be measured as much as possible in terms of ultimate objectives, such as reduced child 
mortality or knowledge acquisition by children. To quote: 
A performance-based approach allows for better ownership of reforms, since 
the choice of instruments would reside with the country; it avoids arbitrary 
judgement on multiple heterogeneous economic policy measures; and it 
facilitates gradual and progressive support according to the degree of progress 
of performance relative to outturns; and by eliminating the scope of discordant 
conditionality, it supports better coordination between donors (Adam et al. 
2004). 
Although the principle of this proposal has not met strong criticism, the likelihood of its 
implementation by a significant number of donors appears rather limited. Even the 
European Union which has taken the pioneering initiative for reform in that direction 
has gone only half way, as the retained conditions refer to intermediate indicators 
related to policy instruments (ibid.). The main obstacles to full implementation of a 
performance-based conditionality are twofold. One is the lack of trust in the capacity 
and will of the recipient countries, which create a vicious circle since capacities will not 
develop fully without ownership. The second and probably more important hindrance is 
the weight of habit within aid agencies. Full performance-based conditionality would 
involve a dramatic change in agency jobs, which would be devoted to monitoring and 
assessing the progress of countries based on a few ultimate development indicators, 
taking into account the impact of exogenous factors, independent of policy. 18 
Furthermore, it may not be possible to undertake such reform in countries which have 
merely a minimal state or are the continually failing states. At least temporarily 
increased aid inflows should be delivered more directly through technical assistance and 
projects implemented in particular through civil societies organizations (EGDI 2006; 
Cohen, Guillaumont Jeanneney and Jacquet 2006); these efforts should bypass the 
failing states (Chauvet and Collier 2005). 
6  Conclusion: how to reconcile the two approaches  
In this paper we have neither rejected the relevance of the big push nor denied the 
existence of serious limitations to absorptive capacity, but asset that both require further 
analysis. The limitations to absorptive capacity do not imply that the big push should be 
abandoned; on the contrary, the big push seems to be needed to remove these obstacles. 
However, this becomes feasible only if aid policies are consistently designed. Our 
general conclusion on the reconciliation of the two approaches is that absorptive 
capacity is heavily dependent on aid itself or on its very modalities. The big push and 
absorptive capacity approaches cannot be reconciled without reforming aid 
supplemented with an increase in aid amounts. Based on that perspective, the following 
main lessons can be drawn. 
First, it is necessary to balance the utilization of aid between directly productive 
activities and social services in order to avoid a transitory loss in competitiveness. 
Second, schemes that promote the use of aid as insurance against exogenous shocks are 
to be enhanced because they lower the risk of Dutch disease and contribute to a faster 
and more equitable long-term growth. Third, due to the higher marginal impact of aid in 
vulnerable countries and in particular the LDCs, where the need for a big push is the 
most obvious, priority should be given to these countries in aid allocation. Finally, as 
much as possible, a performance-based conditionality should be substituted for the 
traditional policy-based one in order to cope with several absorptive capacity 
limitations, of which the sociopolitical element is the most important. An aid supported 
big push will not be effective without a new ownership of policy by the recipient 
countries.  
References 
Adam, C. (2005). ‘Exogenous Inflows and Real Exchange Rates: Theoretical Quirk or 
Empirical Reality?’. Paper presented at the IMF Seminar on Foreign Aid and 
Macroeconomic Management, 14-15 March. Maputo. 
Adam, C., and D. Bevan (2006). ‘Aid and the Supply Side: Public Investment, Export 
Performance and Dutch Disease in Low-Income Countries’. World Bank Economic 
Review, 20 (2): 261-90. 
Adam, C., G. Chambas, P. Guillaumont, S. Guillaumont Jeanneney, and J. Gunning 
(2004). ‘Performance-based Conditionality: A European Perspective’. World 
Development, 32 (6): 1059-70. 19 
Agénor, P.-R., N. Bayraktar, E. Pinto Moreira, and El Aynaoui K. (2006) ‘Achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals in Sub-Saharan Africa. A Macroeconomic 
Monitoring Framework’. World Economy, 29 (11): 1519-47. 
Amprou, J., P. Guillaumont, and S. Guillaumont Jeanneney (2007). ‘Aid Selectivity 
According to Augmented Criteria’. World Economy, 30 (5): 733-63. 
Arellano, C., A. Bulỉř, T. Lane, and L. Lipshitz ((2005). ‘The Dynamic Implications of 
Foreign Aid and its Volatility’. IMF Working Paper 05/119. Washington, DC: IMF. 
Berg, A., M. Hussain, S. Aiyar, S. Roache, and A. Mahone (2005). ‘The 
Macroeconomics of Managing Increased Aid Inflows: Experiences of Low-Income 
Countries and Policy Implications’. Washington, DC: IMF. Mimeo. 
Berg, E. (2003). ‘Augmenter l’efficacité de l’aide: une critique de quelques points de 
vue actuels’. Revue d’économie du développement, 4 (December): 11-42. 
Berthélemy. J.-C. (2006). ‘Clubs de convergence et équilibres multiples: comment les 
économies émergentes ont-elles réussi à échapper au piège du sous-
développement?’. Revue d’économie du développement, 1 (March). 
Bevan, D. L. (2005). ‘An Analytical Overview of Aid Absorption: Recognizing an 
Avoiding Macroeconomic Hazards. Paper presented at the IMF Seminar on Foreign 
Aid and Macroeconomic Management, 14-15 March. Maputo. 
Bulỉř, A., and A. J. Hamann (2003). ‘Aid Volatility: An Empirical Assessment’. IMF 
Staff Papers, 50 (1): 64-89.  
Bulỉř, A., and A. J. Hamann (2005). ‘Volatility of Development Aid: From the Frying 
Pan into the Fire?’. IMF Working Paper No. 06/65. Washington, DC: IMF.  
Burnside, C., and D. Dollar (2000) ‘Aid, Policy and Growth’. American Economic 
Review, 90 (4): 847-68. 
Burnside, C., and D. Dollar (2004). ‘Aid, Policies and Growth: A Reply’. American 
Economic Review, 94 (3): 781-4. 
Chauvet, L., and P. Collier (2005). ‘Policy Turnarounds in Failing States’. Oxford: 
Oxford University and Paris: IRD-DIAL. Mimeo. 
Chauvet, L., and P. Guillaumont (2004). ‘Aid and Growth Revisited: Policy, Economic 
Vulnerability and Political Instability’. In B. Tungodden, N. Stern, and I. Kolstad 
(eds), Towards Pro-Poor Policies. Aid, Institutions and Globalization. Annual World 
Bank Conference on Development Economics, Europe. Washington, DC: World 
Bank and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Chauvet, L., and P. Guillaumont (2006b). Aid Volatility and Growth, with Special 
Reference to Africa’. CERDI Etudes et Documents. Clermont-Ferrand: CERDI. 
Cohen, D., S. Guillaumont Jeanneney, and P. Jacquet (2006). ‘La politique d’aide au 
développement de la France. Introduction générale’. In D. Cohen, S. Guillaumont 
Jeanneney and P. Jacquet (eds), La France et l’aide publique au développement. 
Paris: Le Conseil d’Analyse Economique. 
Collier, P., and D .Dollar (2001). ‘Can the World Cut Poverty in Half? How Policy 
Reform and Effective Aid Can Meet International Development Goals’. World 
Development, 29 (11): 1787-802. 20 
Collier, P., and D. Dollar (2002). ‘Aid, Allocation and Poverty Reduction’. European 
Economic Review, 46 (8): 1475-1500. 
Collier, P., P. Guillaumont, S. Guillaumont Jeanneney, and J. W. Gunning (1997). 
‘Redesigning Conditionality’. World Development, 25 (9): 1399-407. 
Devarajan, S., D. R. Dollar, and T. Holmgren (eds) (2001). Aid and Reform in Africa: 
Lessons from Ten Case Studies. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Easterly, W. (2006a). The White Man’s Burden. Why the West’s Efforts to Aid. The Rest 
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York. The Penguin Press.  
Easterly, W. (2006b). ‘The Big Push Déjà Vu: A Review of Jeffrey Sachs’s The End of 
Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time’. Journal of Economic Literature, 44 
(1): 96-105. 
EGDI (2006). ‘The Politics of Service Deliveries in Democracies. Better Access for the 
Poor’. Expert Group on Development Issues, Write-up from workshop in Stockholm, 
27-28 April 
Eifert, B., and A. Gelb (2005). “Improving the Dynamics of Aid. Towards More 
Predictable Budget Support’. WB Policy Research Working Paper No. 3732. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Fielding, D., and G. Mavrotas (2005). ‘The Volatility of Aid’. WIDER Discussion 
Paper 2005/06. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 
Gomanee, K., S. Girma, and O. Morrissey (2003). ‘Searching for Aid Threshold 
Effects’. Credit Research Paper No. 03/15. Nottingham: CREDIT, University of 
Nottingham. 
Griffin, K. (1970). ‘Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings and Economic Development’. 
Bulletin of the Oxford University, Institute of Economics and Statistics, 32 (2): 99-
112.  
Guillaumont, P. (1967). ‘L’aide au développement en Afrique de l’Ouest: schéma 
d’analyse’ in OCDE’. Progrès social et croissance économique. Paris: Centre de 
développement, 146-71.  
Guillaumont, P. (1971). L’absorption du capital. Paris: Éditions Cujas. 
Guillaumont, P. (1985). Economie du Développement, Tome 3 Dynamique 
internationale du développement. Paris: PUF. 
Guillaumont, P. (2006a). ‘Macroeconomic Vulnerability in Low-Income Countries and 
Aid Responses’. In F. Bourguignon, B. Pleskovic., and J. Van der Gaag (eds), 
Securing Development in an Unstable World. Annual Bank Conference in 
Development Economics, Europe 2005. Washington, DC: World Bank, 65-108.  
Guillaumont, P. (2006b). ‘To Move Out of the Trap: The Least Developed Countries’. 
Economica (forthcoming). 
Guillaumont, P., and L. Chauvet (2001). ‘Aid and Performance: a Reassesment’. 
Journal of Development Studies, 37 (6): 66-92. 21 
Guillaumont, P., and S. Guillaumont Jeanneney (2003). ‘Dampening Price Shocks’. In 
P. Collier and I. Bannon (eds), Natural Resources and Violent Conflicts. 
Washington, DC: World Bank, 353-67. 
Guillaumont, P., S. Guillaumont Jeanneney, P. Jacquet, L. Chauvet, and B. Savoye 
(2005). ‘Attenuating through Aid the Vulnerability to Price Shocks’. In   
F. Bourguignon and P. Jacquet (eds), Economic Integration and Social 
Responsibility. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Guillaumont, P., and R. Lajaaj (2006). ‘When Instability Increases the Marginal 
Effectiveness of Aid Projects’. WB Policy Research Working Paper. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.  
Gunning, J. W. (2004). ‘Why Give Aid?’. Paper presented at the 2nd AFD-EUDN 
Conference Development Aid: Why and How? 25 November. Paris. 
Gupta, S., B. Clements, A. Pivovarsky, and E. Tiongson (2004). “Foreign Aid and 
Revenue Response: Does the Composition of Foreign Aid Matter?’. In S. Gupta, 
B. Clements, and G. Inchauste (eds), Helping Countries Develop. The Role of Fiscal 
Policy. Washington, DC: IMF.  
Gupta, S., R. Powell, and Y. Yang (2005, 2006). ‘The Macroeconomic Challenge of 
Scaling Up Aid to Africa. A Checklist for Practitioners’. Washington, DC: IMF. 
Hadjimichael, M. T., D. Ghura, M. Muhleisen, R. Nord, and E. M. Ucer (1995). ‘Sub-
Saharan Africa: Growth, Savings and Investment, 1986-93’. IMF Occasional Paper 
No. 118. Washington, DC: IMF. 
Hansen, H., and F. Tarp (2000). ‘Aid Effectiveness Disputed’. Journal of International 
Development, 12 (3): 375-98.  
Hansen, H., and F. Tarp (2001). ‘Aid and Growth Regressions’. Journal of Development 
Economics, 64 (2): 547-70.  
Heller, P. S. (2005). ‘Pity the Finance Minister. Issues in Managing a substantial scaling 
Up of Aid Flows’. World Economics, 6 (4): 69-110. 
Isham, J., and D. Kaufmann (1999). ‘The Forgotten Rationale for Policy Reform: The 
Productivity of Investment Projects’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1): 149-
84. 
Isham, J., D. Kaufmann, and L. H. Pritchett (1997). ‘Civil Liberties, Democracy, and 
the Performance of Government Projects’. World Bank Economic Review, 11 (2): 
219-42. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2005). ‘The Macroeconomic of Managing 
Increased Aid Inflows: Experiences of Low-Income Countries and Policy 
Implications’. IMF Policy Development and Review Department. 8 August. 
Washington, DC: IMF. 
Kasekende, L. A., and M. Atingi-Ego (1999). ‘Uganda Experience with Aid’. Journal of 
African Economies, 8 (4): 619-49. 
Kaufmann, D., and Y. Wang (1995). ‘Macroeconomic Policies and Project Performance 
in the Social Sectors: A Model of Human Capital Production and Evidence from 
LDCs’. World Development, 23 (5): 751-65. 22 
Kraay, A., and C. Raddatz (2005). ‘Poverty Traps, Aid, and Growth’. WB Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3631. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Leibenstein, H. (1954). The Theory of Economic-Demographic Development. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Lensink, R., and O. Morrissey (2000). ‘Aid Instability as a Measure of Uncertainty and 
the positive Impact of Aid on Growth’. Journal of Development Studies, 36 (3): 30-
48. 
Lensink, R., and H. White ( 2001). ‘Are there Negative Returns to Aid?’. Journal of 
Development Studies, 37 (6): 42-65. 
Levin, V., and D. Dollar (2005). ‘Sowing and Reaping Institutional Quality and Project 
Outcomes in Developing Countries’. WB Policy Research Working Paper No. 3524. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Mavrotas, G. (2005). ‘Aid Heterogeneity: Looking at Aid Effectiveness from a 
Different Angle’. Journal of International Development, 17 (8): 1019-36. 
Millikan, M. F., and W. W. Rostow (1957). A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign 
Policy. New York: Harpers and Brothers. 
Moss, T., G. Pettersson, and N. van der Walle (2006). “An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A 
Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa’. CGD 
Working Paper No. 74. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. 
Nelson, R. (1956). ‘A Theory of Low Level Equilibrium Trap in Underdeveloped 
Economies’. American Economic Review, 46: 894-908. 
Nurkse, R. (1953). Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
Pallage, S., and M. A. Robe (2001). ‘Foreign Aid and the Business Cycle’. Review of 
International Economics, 9 (4): 641-72. 
Papanek, G. F. (1973). ‘Aid, Foreign Private Investment, Savings and growth in Less 
Developed Countries’. Journal of Political Economy, 81 (1): 120-30. 
Rajan, R. G., and A. Subramanian (2005a). What Undermines Aid’s Impact on 
Growth?’. IMF Working Paper 05/126. Washington, DC: IMF. 
Rajan, R. G., and A. Subramanian (2005b). ‘Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-
Country Evidence Really Show?’. IMF Working Paper WP/05/127. Washington, 
DC: IMF. 
Rand, J., and F. Tarp (2002). ‘Business Cycles in Developing Countries: Are They 
Different?’. World Development, 30 (12): 2071-88.  
Roodman, D. (2004). ‘The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development and Cross-country 
Empirics’. CGD Working Paper  No. 32. Washington, DC: Center for Global 
Development. 
Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N. (1943). ‘Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South 
Eastern Europe’. The Economic Journal, 53 (June-September): 202-11. 23 
Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N. (1961a). ‘Notes on the Theory of the Big Push’. In H. S. Ellis 
and H. C. Wallich (eds), Economic Development for Latin America. New York: 
St Martin’s Press. 
Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N. (1961b). ‘International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries’. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 63 (2): 107-32. 
Sachs, J. (2005). The End of Poverty. How We Can Make it Happen in our Lifetime. 
London: Penguin Book. 
Sachs, J., J. W. McArthur, G. Schmidt-Traub, M. Kruk, C. Bahadur, M. Faye, and 
G. McCord (2004). ‘Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap’. Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, No. 1, 117-239. 
Svensson, J. (2006). ‘Absorption Capacity and Disbursement Constraints’. Paper 
presented at the third AFD-EUDN Conference Financer le développement: les défis 
d’un doublement de l’aide, December. Paris. 
Tarp, F. (2003) ‘Book Review of “Aid and Reform in Africa”  by S. Devarajan, 
D. R. Dollar, and T. Holmgren’. Journal of African Economics, 10 (3): 341-53. 
World Bank (2005, 2006) Global Monitoring Report. Washington, DC. 
 